Introduction

On December 1, 1901, all the Officers stationed at Batangas, Batangas Province, P.I., called on General Bell in a body. Chairs were brought into the room, and after the Officers were seated General Bell addressed to them the following remarks, which were taken down by two stenographers:—M.F.D.

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Gentlemen:—I presume, as is natural, you would like to know just why I have been sent here and what policy I expect to pursue and enforce. I have something to say to you on this subject and am very glad to meet all of you today and to have this opportunity to explain my views and purposes. I am very well acquainted with the difficulties you have had to contend with, and clearly understand that I shall need not only loyalty to my views and purposes, but also your cordial and energetic co-operation to succeed in the task that has been assigned to me. I have been sent here with instructions to put an end to insurrection and re-establish peace in the shortest time practicable. As I am well aware that American officers and soldiers have an individuality and opinions of their own, and can always cooperate with much greater zeal, cordiality, energy and satisfaction when they feel that their Commanding General’s views are correct, just and best calculated to accomplish our purpose, it is natural that I should want your views to coincide with mine. I shall therefore take pains to explain my views to you at some length, in the hope that you may become convinced that they are sound and reasonable.

The average American officer and soldier is kind-hearted and sympathetic, and, unless he has been in these Islands sufficiently long to have graduated from all the various schools of experience, it is very difficult for him to give thoroughly loyal and unflinching support to a policy which appears to be inconsistent with his kind and sympathetic feeling toward the ignorant and misguided people of these Islands. Therefore, in the first place, I want to ask you not to conclude that because I expect to radically change the policy which has heretofore been pursued, that I disapprove or am inclined to criticise that policy. I am not. Our general policy has heretofore been one of great benevolence and forbearance, a policy of attraction and conciliation, and I have always sympathized with and vigorously upheld this policy because I think it right in principle. I am sorry to have to acknowledge, however, that in a number of instances this policy has not been as successful or efficient as I had hoped it might always be. In order to give you a clearer comprehension of my present convictions, I shall now review some of the details of our past policy.

All of you who were here in the early days will doubtless recall that before the first Peace Commission arrived in these Islands no definite policy had ever been announced. Except in the city of Manila, the government throughout the Islands was in the hands of insurgents. As we had not come for the purpose of fighting Filipinos, we all had instructions to be kind, considerate and just to them, and our natural sympathy and kindly feeling for them made that policy agreeable to us. But unfortunately, from the very beginning, the natives entirely misunderstood this policy and attributed it to fear and weakness. They became very arrogant, conceited and aggressive. Those of you who were in the city of Manila when it was practically besieged by insurgents, will remember that they taunted us with being cowards and were exceedingly anxious, to all appearances, to try conclusions with us. By January of 1899 they had become so bold and certain of their comparative strength that feeling and enthusiasm on their part ran high and they tried in every conceivable manner to provoke us into making an attack upon them.

A conviction began to gain ground in the army, first among the soldiers, who came in more intimate contact with the people, then among the officers, that our policy was an error and that sooner or later we would be compelled to give the Filipino army a sound thrashing in order to inspire it with some sense and cause the people to realize that they were trifling with a power far greater than they had any conception of. It soon became perfectly apparent to everyone that war had to come, and when it was finally precipitated it came with a rush. The army, stung to the quick by taunting insults of arrogant, conceited, presumptions and ungrateful enemies, went at them with such vigor that they were swept like chaff out of our way. Then with a full realization of their utter weakness and folly, benevolence and sympathy succeeded excitement, and, if anything, greater consideration was shown them than ever before, in the vain hope that after their one drastic lesson they would come to their senses and see the futility of prolonging an unequal struggle. In those days, having no prisons, all prisoners captured were speedily liberated. We captured, searched and turned them loose minus arms but plus rations and advice. We frequently received instructions to turn them loose on the battlefield after disarming them. I have thus liberated many, some of whom promptly returned to their army and were captured over again. I have captured letters written to insurgents by apparently peaceful residents of towns we were occupying who had pretended to be our best friends. These letters gave full and complete information of our movements and expressed the utmost sympathy for the cause. I would show such letters to the individuals who wrote them, advise them sarcastically to hereafter be more cautious and transact such business by word of mouth, and then admonish them to go and sin no more.

In the Province of Pampanga this policy of benevolence and consideration was entirely efficacious, but I know of no other case in which it succeeded in accomplishing the desired result. But, as I have previously stated, I believe in that policy and always continued to practice it until it became clearly demonstrated that a change was necessary in special localities.

We all soon saw that we would have to commence to imprison captured insurgents and the disloyal element of the population, and that we would have to punish war rebels and war traitors. As long as the benevolent and conciliatory policy succeeded, I advocated a strict adherence to it, but my experience finally convinced me that it alone could not be efficacious in dealing with Tagalogs. In fact I think that we have all had sufficient experience to conclude that this policy cannot work with them without modification. They are unquestionably the smartest and best educated of all the tribes in the Philippines Islands, but at the same time they are the most cunning, unscrupulous and conscienceless. They are the most agreeable and attractive, but the most enamoured with independence and license which they mistake for liberty.

Batangas is the very heart of the Tagalog region. Cavite is the cradle of insurrection and the birthplace of many of the political and military leaders. Laguna and Tayabas are but little less addicted to insurrection than the other two. Batangas is the hub of this Brigade. The insurrection has been more vigorously and numerously sustained here, I think, than elsewhere, because Batangas, being richer, has contributed more members to foreign juntas than have the other provinces. These leaders advise their families and friends here to continue the struggle

But, notwithstanding their advice, the people of Batangas can have peace whenever they want it, and it should be our mission to make them want it as soon as we can by legitimate methods.

It is not possible to convince these irreconcilable and unsophisticated people by kindness and benevolence alone that you are right and they are wrong, nor could you likewise convince the ignorant tao that what you advise him to do is best and what his principale orders him to do is wrong, because the only argument the majority of either class can understand and appreciate is one of physical force.

To successfully deal with the common people, the head men, the leaders, the principales are the ones we need to influence. The common hombre is dominated body and soul by his master, the principale. He is simply a blind tool, a poor down-trodden ignoramus, who does not know what is good for him and cannot believe an American. We cannot appear to him directly. It is impossible. You can no more influence him by benevolent persuasion than you can fly. He is going to do whatever he is told to do by his master or his leaders, because he is incapable of doing anything else.

Therefore, to succeed in our purpose, we must make it in the interest of his leaders to order and counsel him to do what we want him to do. To bring this about we must make the principale the object of our special study and effort.

In order to carry such a policy to a successful issue it will, in all probability, be generally necessary to adopt drastic measures, but it is not necessary to be harsh, humiliating or overbearing in manner to enforce drastic measures. If you can persist in maintaining a firm and relentless policy with the manner of a Chesterfield, so much the better.

Be considerate and courteous in manner, but firm and relentless in action. Say little, and let acts, not words, convey your meaning. Words from us count for nothing. The more an officer talks the less they think he is going to do. The more he does and the less he says the more apprehensive they become while waiting for what is to happen next. Except when necessary to give due warning, do not tell them what you are going to do, but do it. Above all things do not threaten. Threats are invariably interpreted as a sign of weakness. When necessary to give warning, tell them in a mild and dispassionate way what is forbidden and what will be the consequence of disobedience. The more dispassionate your language, the more cool and collected your manner, the freer from excitement and calmer your tone of voice, the more influence your words will have. But they very soon judge by acts, not words, and this fact should never be forgotten.

I hardly think it necessary to caution those of you who have been in these Islands as much as two years that these people are past masters in the art of deception; that you cannot afford to believe what they say about their relations with the insurrection unless it be backed up by some act which has so committed them to the side of Americans as to greatly antagonize insurgents. When a native has done something of that kind, he can be trusted not to deceive you for the benefit of insurgents, but when, without having committed an open act of friendship for Americans, he comes with profuse professions of friendship and offers to do all he can for you, keep an eye to his motives and watch his actions closely. Whenever he is the first to offer you a house, a bed or other necessity, with profuse protestations of friendship and abuse of insurgents, you should not go to sleep and cease efforts to fathom his real sentiments. Such conduct is frequently an indication of a desire to throw you off your guard and thus enable the schemer to aid your enemies in safety.

I beg you will not think me over suspicious. I do not like suspicious people; I very much dislike those who base ordinary actions upon suspicion; such conduct is very repugnant to us all, but, gentlemen, we are here to conduct war, and, under such circumstances as surround us, we cannot do it successfully without some times acting on suspicion as a necessary precaution.

I have learned this sad fact by experience, for I am naturally unsuspicious. I have frequently let men go and greatly regretted it afterwards when I plainly saw that I ought to have held them a reasonable time for investigation and for hunting evidence against them. I have released men found on the battlefield because they told me a plausible story, had no uniform on and because no evidence was at hand showing that they were insurgents. In some cases I subsequently learned that I had released important officers, and when too late I recognized that I had been foolishly sympathetic and lenient. It is very disagreeable to hold natives on suspicion, I even grant that it seems unfair and unjust, but, under such circumstances as surround us, it is unquestionably a military necessity and therefore in accordance with the laws of war.

In the Province of Pangasinan, which has always been celebrated for disorder and ladronism, the organized insurrection broke out. Insurgents deserting with their arms, scattered into small bands, and the province was soon at the mercy of a horde of armed cut-throats and robbers. The people became so terrorized they did not dare to help us. Anyone suspected of sympathy or friendship for Americans was promptly assassinated. We could get no information and could accomplish nothing. There was no organized insurrection, but those who possessed the guns were living in the towns by day and raiding the countryside by night. The necessity for garrisoning every town, in order to give protection to those peaceably inclined, soon became apparent. The troops were obtained and the towns were garrisoned. When the people saw we were able to protect them they began to help us, and through persistent efforts in detecting, arresting and confining the scheming, murdering, unscrupulous leaders and ladrones among the people, and through running down and capturing the arms, the province became very tranquil and peace reigned supreme. This was not accomplished, however, without having to do many disagreeable things. At one time more heartless murderers and political assassins had been convicted and hung in that province than in all the rest of the Islands put together. One day, referring to necessary executions, the Division Commander told me, with much concern, that circumstances had forced him to approve more death sentences, he thought, than any one man who ever lived; that such a thing was keenly distressing to him, but that he could see no possible way to avoid it and do his duty.

I was ordered from Pangasinan to Manila, at that time the hot-bed of insurgent intrigue, their base of supply and a safe haven of rest and recuperation for insurgents who were worn out and sick from continuous pursuit in the provinces. I was required by the Division Commander to institute a severe and drastic policy there for the purpose of ridding the city of insurgents, schemers, sympathizers, aiders and abetters. I have never done any duty in my life which was quite so disagreeable, but after six months of such a policy the city was completely changed in political attitude. When I left there I do not believe there was an active insurgent in it and inactive sympathizers were afraid to operate. Just before my departure some active insurgents from the provinces arrived in Manila for rest and recuperation. No former friend or sympathizer could be found who dared to give them food or shelter, and they were finally forced to voluntarily surrender to the Provost Marshal General, and when they did so they confessed they had surrendered because they had no place to live and nothing to eat.

All this was accomplished by a determined and persistent effort to ferret out and punish the guilty, who were held in prison with relentless firmness.

It will unquestionably be necessary for us to adopt in this Brigade a policy similar to that which was enforced in the Province of Pangasinan and in the City of Manila. We owe the pacific people protection and must adopt some way of demonstrating our ability to give it. We must then show our intention to punish insurgents and those who aid and assist them. In doing this we will unquestionably be required, by a sense of duty, to do much that is disagreeable. But after all armed insurgents are forced to submit to constituted authority and peaceful conditions are re-established within the Brigade, we can then be benevolent and generous again and convince the people that we are their real friends. Without first whipping them and convincing them that we are able to accomplish our purposes by force if necessary, we can never gain their friendship, because otherwise we can never command their respect.

In connection with the enforcement of such a policy, I want to mention certain serious difficulties I have encountered in the past which can easily be avoided: The lack of information concerning prisoners of war has always been a source of much embarrassment. Though it may be necessary to confine prisoners on suspicion and may not be possible to investigate their cases promptly, a record can and should be kept by the commanding officer of every station, which should show, concerning every prisoner, his full name, town and barrio in which he lives, date of arrest, by whom arrested, and for what arrested. In case arrested on suspicion of what he is suspected should always be stated in full. All these things are absolutely essential in making subsequent disposition of prisoners. A permanent record must be kept of every prisoner, and when he ceases to be a prisoner the disposition made of him should be noted. Whenever released the date thereof and by whose order the action was taken should be shown. I have known some officers who merely scratched a prisoner’s name from the record when releasing him. This is wrong. Full and complete information concerning every prisoner should be retained in the permanent record so it may be available for future reference. It is especially necessary and desirable to give in a column of remarks as full and complete a political history of each prisoner as possible.

I expect to have temporary prisons prepared in all towns as soon as possible. The lack of adequate facilities for confining prisoners has been one of the greatest drawbacks to our success in the past. I am aware that it will be very difficult to provide adequate facilities in most towns for confining many prisoners, but now that the dry, cool season is coming on they can be confined in sheds inside of stockades. Our leniency or failure to hold or punish them has encouraged ignorant people to continue the struggle. They can only understand restraint which is imposed by force, and in the absence thereof they continue to do as they prefer. I promise that each commanding officer shall have facilities for confining prisoners, and, without exceptional reasons, no prisoner shall be released until after the officer who captured and confined him has been consulted. It may become apparent that the release of certain prisoners will best serve our purpose, but no prisoner shall be released whose presence in his accustomed haunts or whose influence would be embarrassing to the operations of the officer who arrested him. Except in the clearest cases of wrong identity or evident error, prisoners of war will not be released until it is shown that their release will serve the interests of the government.

I have a personal prejudice against burning for the reason that I never thought it did much good. On the contrary it has appeared to me that it did more harm than good in most cases. I recognize the impossibility, however, of depriving insurgents of shelter in the mountains without destroying the shelter which is there. With reference to houses and other shelters used as cuartels there, I shall subordinate my preference and scruples to the judgement of commanding officers as to what may be necessary. Fortunately there are few private houses there and these are small grass and nipa shacks.

We have only one purpose, and that is to force the insurgents and those in active sympathy with them to want peace. In accomplishing this we must pay particular attention to the attitude of principales who live in towns under our protection and are the eyes and ears and business agents of insurgents outside. These are the people we most need to investigate. We must get evidence of their complicity and keep them in prison until they are tired of helping to maintain the insurrection and ready to work for peace. We must deprive the insurgents of supplies and prevent their getting more. But in order to inflict the least hardship practicable upon the people, we must adopt some means by which we can afford protection to those who really desire to be peaceful. We must garrison every town, and I shall secure sufficient additional troops to do this as soon as possible. It will do little good to chase our troops around the country hunting insurgents until we have chased the spies and unarmed pickets out of the towns and barrios. We will simply wear out our men, and the insurgents, well advised in ample time, will continue to avoid us by hiding and make merry over our inability to find them. I presume here, as elsewhere, they have a barrio hombre continually stationed on every prominent height who gives them ample warning of approaching troops.

We have been through all of this up north where I have just come from. There every pueblo, barrio and sitio was well organized by the Katipunans [members of the Filipino Secret Society]. At first it was impossible to get any information, but by patience and perseverance we finally learned their system, completely broke up their secret organizations in the towns and barrios, and then the insurgents had to surrender. We hope to pursue the same policy here. We soon found we could not get near insurgents living in the mountains by means of movements in the day time. When we learned the paths and trails sufficiently well, we moved only at night, avoiding the barbios and barking dogs.

In the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Sur some of the people living in the foothills and mountains and localities distant from the pueblos, weary of the oppressive exactions of insurgents, moved into the towns. Surprising as it may possibly seem to you, in nearly every town in Ilocos Norte the people, tiring of the insurrection and wishing to protect themselves against the oppressions of insurgent foraging parties, marauding by night, built bamboo fences around the outskirts of their towns. It is hard to believe that they can build a stockade fence of bamboo from 12 to 14 miles in length in less than a week, but nevertheless it is a fact. When I first saw these fences it seemed to me they could do little good, but the tops of the bamboo poles were sharpened and it was practically impossible to get over them or cut a hole through the fence without making so much noise as to attract attention. They turned the entire population out to work. Some dug the ditches, some cut and sharpened bamboo poles and others set them up in the ditches. When the fences were built the people moved inside and went out only in the daytime. Few gates were left and municipal police guarded these by night. Through this voluntary assistance, we were soon able to starve the insurgents out, as they no longer had their supply organization, for knowing that our troops were covering the country at night their secret agents and spies dare not go out with food.

We found that much of the money paid by the government was divided with insurgents, and I presume the same condition exists here. I shall ask the government to suspend the payment of rents for the present and also to close the ports to prevent insurgents from bringing supplies from the outside.

As many poor people are engaged in furnishing sacati, wood and other supplies to the troops, I think it best to pay them. But if, after our policy is changed, they should refuse to work for pay, it is almost certain that they are intimidated by someone. To combat such a move, we will have to arrest the principales and local officials and make them get the supplies as prisoners of war unless they are willing to induce the common people to furnish them as usual. When an ignorant hombre thus suddenly changes his attitude there can be no doubt he does it because he is ordered to do so.

Assassination in broad daylight and at other times must stop. We must adopt such measures that will make the life of an Americanista safer than that of any insurgent in this Brigade. We must demonstrate to those who would be friendly our ability to protect them.

I have requested of General Chaffee 300 copies of G.O. 100, and when received a copy will be furnished to every officer in the Brigade. We shall hereafter conduct war in accordance with that order, and I shall confer upon each officer authority to do any reasonable and just thing which is authorized by that order. It authorizes executing prisoners of war, without trial, in retaliation against assassination, but inasmuch as I do not wish to place this heavy burden of responsibility upon other shoulders than my own, I shall forbid such executions without my authority.

When we make a radical and drastic change of policy by adopting as our guide G.O. 100, it is very probable that great resentment will at first be aroused among the people, and they may at once begin a policy of lawless assassination of American soldiers and civilians, Americanistas and native employees, necessitating this severe measure of retaliation. I shall probably apply some other remedial action in Tanauan and Bauan where Americanistas have so recently been assassinated in public places in broad daylight, as before adopting such a radical measure I think fairness demands due warning.

It is impossible to announce a general policy equally applicable to all conditions, but the basis of my policy will be to require respect for the American flag and submission to constituted authority. To do this it is not necessary for any one to conduct himself in an ungentlemanly manner, but he must be quick and firm. But whenever one becomes angered and excited it is better to postpone action, to sleep on the matter and act the next day. If absolutely essential to act more promptly let anger be controlled and action be moderate but firm.

I presume there are a few people in the Brigade who have rendered Americans such service as to have aroused the bitter resentment of insurgents and subjected their lives to danger. I shall ask that especial efforts be made to protect these people against assassination. They should also be protected from misrepresentation by revengeful sympathizers with insurrection. Be on the watch for false denunciation and intrigues against them. Natives frequently forge letters implicating our best friends and drop them where they will be found by us. Be cautious and investigate carefully before any man is arrested who has been serving us. The revengeful enemy apparently never forgets and frequently abides his time and waits until all the officers who are acquainted with the character and services of friendly natives are ordered away. Then when a new garrison arrives some insurgent will warm himself into the confidence of the new commanding officer for the sole purpose of getting even with those who have really helped us in the past. In order to preclude the possibility of this, every commanding officer ordered away should, before leaving, write a report of the services that such men have rendered and leave it with his successor, sending a copy thereof to these Headquarters. We must avoid, if possible, arresting men who have rendered us friendly services in the past and those who would like to serve us if they felt that we could give them proper protection.

So far as insurgents are concerned, whenever captured or arrested I shall want them held. Turn none of them loose without good reason. If an individual insurgent soldier comes in and surrenders with a gun, accept his surrender and turn him loose to encourage others to do likewise, but if they come to surrender without guns confine them in prison and keep them there until the guns are forthcoming. We want guns much worse than we want insurgents, and if they could find that they could surrender and obtain liberty without surrendering their arms we would obtain a mighty few. When we get all the arms there will be no more insurrection.

I do not want to be understood as advocating any policy which involves unauthorized methods as a means of extracting information. Information so obtained is generally worthless. It sometimes results in getting a gun but seldom leads to important results. We want to accomplish our purpose without resorting to any methods that are liable to demoralize our men and that always do more harm than good.

Prisoners in need of prison discipline may be confined a limited time in dark cells, provided they and the cells are healthy, or be placed in solitary confinement on bread and water for limited periods of time. But doctors should regularly examine them with a view to guarding against doing any permanent injury.

If you have evidence that the officials of any town are concealing information or sending out the same to the enemy, they should be tried or properly disciplined. As subjects of the United States these men all owe allegiance to the government, but as public officials who have taken an oath to be loyal and well and faithfully perform their duties, they are under an additional obligation to render loyal service.

I presume it will seem to your judgment, as it does to mine, impossible for a political assassination to occur in any town, in broad daylight, in public places, without every local official and principale knowing who did it within 24 hours. If they do not, they can easily find out. Local officials who do not apprehend such assassins, or at least give full information as to their identity to commanding officers, should be arrested and held responsible for neglect of duty.

I have never known an insurgent officer to order a presidente to build a bridge or do something else, that it was not promptly done. I have frequently known presidentes to make many promises but find it impossible to conclude any necessary public work ordered by commanding officers. To correct such conditions it will only be necessary to use a bit of determination and firmness. Confine the delinquent official in order to teach him you mean what you say and you will doubtless have little trouble in the future.

By cruel ontrages and inhuman expedients, insurgents have created a reign of terror in these Islands which intimidates the people against giving us any assistance, but by legitimate means we must produce sufficient fear of our power to at least prevent their helping insurgents. We cannot resort to assassination for this purpose as they do, but by retaliation we can and must render the life of every friendly native and American at least as safe as that of an insurgent anywhere. I shall certainly do all that can be accomplished by legitimate means in this direction. It is my purpose, by giving them proper protection, to turn the inhabitants against the insurrection and secure their earnest and loyal assistance in efforts to re-establish peace. This was accomplished in the north and I believe it can be accomplished here, notwithstanding these people are all Tagalogs.

As soon as I have studied the situation for a few days, I shall begin the issuance of definite written instructions.

Gen. Franklin Bell