NO NEWS received for long months in the United States have been fraught with so much deep significance as a simple paragraph that caught my eye in an Omaha paper this morning as I sat at breakfast in the cars on my way home from the Philippines. It said that General J. Franklin Bell is in command in Batangas; that Wint, with his cavalry, is helping him, and that concentrado methods are now being employed with the natives.

To anyone familiar with the situation, that means the end of Malvar's reign; the smashing of the big center of insurrection. It means much more. It means that Chaffee has had fresh orders from Washington; it means the discomfiture of one or two generals and half a dozen colonels who have been incapable of tackling Malvar and have prevented junior officers from doing any good. Above all, it is a fresh and glorious triumph for J. Franklin Bell, that they have had to get him to do it; it is a chance for Colonel Wint to win a new pair of spurs—I hope they have a golden, star for their rowels—and it means that the rugged old chap in command, General Chaffee, has the discernment to pick out the real fighting men of his army to do the work. It is no use trying to tell you of the American world who now and again glance at your paper and read of a “hike" or a “scrap,” and a movement here, surrender or the capture of guns there, or a few killed and wounded, how much this signifies. What does it mean to you? Not much. The social news of your set is vastly more exciting. But I can only try to tell you what it means to one who has been through the whole bloody business who knows the ground, the game, and the value of all the players. During my last evening in Manila I had a long interview with General Chaffee. It was not the journalist and the general; rather a talk between two people who knew each what the other knew. But the day before our luncheon Colonel Wint told me about Taguma and Batangas as he found them, and as that came first I Will give you some of the details.

Colonel Wint had been stationed at San Pablo for some time. He had only a portion of his regiment with him, which prevented him, without the cooperation of other commands, from making any enclosing movements on insurgent forces, even when he properly located them. One incident will explain the relations existing between the regimental commanders at that time, and how the lack of a vigorous general in command of the district served to defeat the efforts of an aggressive man. Colonel Wint made it a point to distribute all the information obtained relating to the enemy to all the commanders in the vicinity. In One case he planned a movement and invited the co-operation of two others. One of them, desiring glory for his forces rather than the defeat of the insurgents, sent out ahead of the others a small force to tackle the insurgents. This force was defeated by the insurgents and driven in with loss. The insurgents then moved their position, and the general movement planned never took place. I will mention no names, and if the cap fits any particular officers let them wear it in secret.

Wint went on working hard, and at the time we met he had so ably performed the work of Scouting and obtaining secret information that he laid the whole condition of Batangas and Malvar's control on the table.

It was the old story of an insurgent population wearing amigo clothes but with rifles in their hatches; the whole people supporting the insurgents with money, food, and arms, and augmenting the forces whenever the insurgents could make a fight with advantage. Malvar was then collecting not less than $20,000 tax a month from the natives, the town of Lipa alone contributing $3,000 in money and contributions. No matter though our troops were there, a secret insurgent government levying and collecting taxes existed everywhere beneath the surface. Sometimes an incident happened; then we learned a little. But nothing was ever done in these days, for a court martial was hanging like the sword of Damocles over the head of any officer who dared to burn a house or injure a native unless he found him actually in the field with arms in his hand.

For instance: The insurgents charged a vendor of meat a tax of $1 for every load he brought to town. One day they tried to raise it to $2. He refused. The meat was seized, about 1,200 pounds, and thus we learned of the game. The beef was traced to a neighboring village, where it was being consumed, in Inference, an insurgent village; result, nothing done.

Tecson, ex-president of San Pablo, was removed from that position for his double-dealing. Among other crimes he had a great many of the rich residents arrested on charges of complicity with the insurgents One by one, he claimed to the commanding officer that he had been mistaken, until all were set free. It was afterward discovered that he got $100 a head to procure their release. The Civil Commission returned him to the town recently as a justice of the peace! This is the kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the island, reinstating insurgents and rogues, and turning down the men who have during the struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.”

It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil Commission, through its ex-insurgent office holders, and by its continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the military rule of the islands, has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deported.

The action of the Commission may be blind-let us hope it is for at present it is undoubtedly at the head of a set of natives who are using its sheltering influence to defeat the consistent efforts of the general commanding to establish order.

In the case of this charming Oriental, Tecson, Colonel Wint had discovered him deeply in a plot to defame the new Presidente in order that he might be removed and himself reinstated. He is still the justice of the peace, one of the tribes of the Civil Commission. Colonel Winter is too good an officer to criticize his seniors in command.

However, as I drove through the Manila streets afew reflections passed through my mind that are worth recalling. I Wondered why General Sumner had considered Manila a good center from which to conduct an active campaign against General Malvar in Batangas. General Chaffee evidently wondered the same thing, for General Sumner had his headquarters removed to Batangas by order. Perhaps the fact that Manila is a good place to entertain—for which Mr. Sumner has a reputation— had something to do with this. Then I Wondered why, since his headquarters had been for some time in Batangas, Malvar was still as happy as ever. There is no spleen in these reflections, for General Sumner once had a horse of mine taken care of for a whole month, and I am indebted to the general for it. Then I wondered why General MacArthur had ever considered that rotten hot-bed of insurrection, Batangas, a fit and proper place to recommend to Governor Taft for civil government. I equally wondered why Taft accepted it. Then I reflected further—and they are not pretty reflections, and many who know think the same way—did not MacArthur “pacify" Batangas, Bohol, Samar, and Albay on paper and hold his troops to their posts there in case they should have engagements, all to prove to you, trusting people of the United States, that he, MacArthur, was a second Otis, that the war was over, and “the situation well in hand?” Then I Wondered if General Chaffee knew all the things that I knew, and if so why he failed to do something. I know Chaffee, and inaction without a reason is not like the “old man,” as we call him in camp.

The next evening I called on him and found that he knew all about it. He also knew that I knew about things, for he had been reading my articles in LEslie's WEEKLY and said “they seized the situation up exactly,” which is more than he said about certain correspondents in China. Well, we talked for a long time and it was all the same thing over again: the treachery of the Presidentes, the “amigo” native with his buried rifle; and we said a little about Samar, but not much, for the massacre was horrible news then and we had been in China with the men and the officers—I can never forgive them for murdering “Tommy"—so we said little, and indeed the less we said the better, for it must be almost over there now; they will have paid for the massacre of Company C.

Then Chaffee told me the real reason why nothing was done. He said: “Now down in Batangas my officers are afraid to move; no man will do his duty when he knows he will be court-martialed for it! They see what's going on but are powerless to do anything. Burn a house, or strike an insurgent village, though the whole population is against us, and they will be court-martialed for it!” Then I Broke eagerly, “But, general, knowing all this, you would not back up the charges preferred against them by their senior officers?” The general was silent, but he looked at me and I understood. We all know that there is such a place as Washington. I also knew that at that moment there was a report most vigorously setting forth the necessities of the campaign, bearing the general's signature, on its way to that city. Judging by this morning's news either General Chaffee has decided to settle the matter properly and take the consequences, or that “something ”which he would not mention has been removed. If President Roosevelt has anything to do with this, my compliments. He will win the hearts of sixty thousand soldiers in the Philippines. Let the President, government, and the people stand by Chaffee, even if it is necessary to clip the wings of the Civil Commission for a while, and there will soon be more agriculture and less bloodshed in the Philippines.

*General Wharton, of great experience in the islands, is particularly strong in condemning the injustice and folly of this.

The adoption by the United States of Concentrado methods at last, is a striking commentary on the fundamental injustice of the howl that we raised against Spain When dispassionately examined the system is the only device successful under the peculiar circumstances of an indiscriminate war on the total population including women and children.

Up till now the people of Batangas have been declaredly insurgent by their active assistance of the cause and their silent protection of its members. The army now says, Here are towns and territories under the American flag. All who come in here and declare for our cause will be protected and fed; all who remain out will be treated as insurgents and enemies. The choice is fair. The population can humbug us no longer, and those who have the courage of their convictions can take the chance against us in the field.

It is a simple device to separate the friendly from the unfriendly, to protect the friendly element from being terrorized or lived upon by the armed bands, and to force the latter, no longer able to live upon the population, to try conclusions with our troops in the field. There is a sentimental section of our people who never will see any question broadly; they fix their eyes on one side of it and howl. They did it during the Civil War, they are doing it about Africa; we may again expect to hear the familiar wail.

But it is a long cry to the Philippines, and before the echo ever reaches there I expect Bell will have finished his work and done it well. He is a strong man, for he succeeds in spite of his enemies and his love for seeing and stating facts as they are. Let the country watch the man. If ever there is a big war and Bell is in it he will serve his country well and do the work of a dozen men. Nor should the “old man” in Manila be forgotten. He is the first major-general in command of the Philippines who has properly diagnosed the case of the Philippines and proceeded to administer the physic.